At the Irish Association of Pension Funds Annual Investment Conference held last week, Brendan Kennedy, the Pensions Regulator, reiterated the Pensions Authority’s continued focus on good governance and its plans for ramping up the Authority’s programme of engagement with trustees of defined benefit schemes. This engagement includes continuing to invite such trustees to meet with
As part of its remit, the Pensions Authority is responsible for the monitoring and supervision of, and the issuing of guidelines or guidance notes on, the operation of the Pensions Act. One of the key objectives of the Pensions Authority for 2016 and the coming years is to provide further guidance for trustees of occupational pension schemes.
At a Pensions Authority Seminar in January, the first tranche of the Authority’s Codes of Governance for Defined Contribution Schemes were launched with the second tranche released this week. There are currently six codes available here covering the following topics:
- Governance plan of action;
- Trustee meetings;
- Managing conflicts of interest;
- Collection and remittance of contributions;
- Investing scheme assets; and
- Paying benefits.
What is the Omega Pharma case?
The Omega Pharma case has confirmed that the scheme’s governing documentation and not the Pensions Act minimum funding standard determine the employer’s liability to contribute to defined benefit schemes on wind-up.
On 25 July 2014, Mr Justice Moriarty in the Commercial Court handed down judgment in the case of Holloway & Ors v Damianus BV & Ors  IEHC 383 and found in favour of the trustees of the Omega Pharma defined benefit scheme in their claim for deficit contributions against the scheme’s employers. The trustees succeeded in obtaining judgment in the amount of €2,439,193.56 (inclusive of interest) against the employers. On appeal, the newly established Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in favour of the trustees (Holloway & ors -v- Damianus BV & ors  IECA 19).
If the Element Six case (Greene & Ors v Coady & Ors  IEHC 38) was the most important pensions law case for trustees in the recent past, the Omega Pharma case was not far behind. The Omega Pharma case is also particularly relevant to employers who operate or participate in defined benefit schemes. However, a number of key issues remain unanswered.
On Friday last, Justice Moriarty delivered his judgment in the case of Holloway & Ors v Damianus BV & Ors (Record No. 2013/6239P).
This case arose out of a contribution demand issued by the trustees of a defined benefit pension scheme in 2012. The demand was issued following the service by the principal employer…
Two liability management options we are seeing considered more and more frequently by Irish sponsoring employers of defined benefit schemes are pension increase exchange exercises (where members agree to forego an entitlement to increases on their pensions in the future in return for something now, for example, a higher starting flat pension) and transfer out exercises (where members agree to an enhanced transfer value in lieu of a future pension promise and transfer out of the scheme).
The rationale for these types of exercises is that liabilities are crystallised at the inducement date and risk of future adverse experience (for example, higher index-linked increases than estimated or adverse investment experience) are eliminated from the scheme. An enhanced transfer value will usually be more than the statutory minimum funding standard but less than the equivalent of the cost of buying out the pension with a deferred annuity. The funding position of the scheme and financial position and prospects of the sponsoring employer will drive this. A key risk, of course, is that members do not fully understand what they are being asked to give up and seek to challenge the inducement exercise in the future.
The funding difficulties facing defined benefit schemes in this country at the moment as well as the strengthening of the Pensions Act funding requirements and re-introduction of funding standard deadlines has seen both scheme sponsors and trustees adopt an increasingly more creative approach to satisfying statutory obligations as well as providing a sustainable basis for funding. This might include putting in place security in favour of the trustees of the scheme, swapping equity for a scheme deficit (see, for example, the deal struck by UK company, Uniq with the trustees of its pension scheme in 2011 and the recent arrangement proposed by Independent News and Media Group to the trustees of its scheme where the scheme appears to have been offered a 5% equity stake in the IN&M Group as part of a broader deal around restructuring), revising the funding obligation or providing an unsecured parent company guarantee.…
The current state of funding of DB schemes has pushed many of the sponsoring employers of these schemes to consider how to minimise their defined benefit liabilities and risks. In order for the liability management process to be successful, a number of key stakeholders need to be managed. These are:
- the trustees of the scheme;
- the employees; and
- the unions.…
After much talk over the past 2 or 3 years, at last sovereign annuities have become a reality… nearly. This week, I was one of the speakers at the launch of the first sovereign annuity approved by the Pensions Board. Getting to this point is a major milestone in the long journey towards being able to use sovereign annuities. We are not quite there yet though.
One of the speakers at the launch was Anthony Linehan of the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA). The view in the industry is that sovereign annuities are most likely to be backed by Irish sovereign bonds. Mr Linehan gave a very interesting presentation on the bonds which the State will issue to back sovereign annuities and the process for issuing and pricing those bonds.
It seems that the State will issue what are being called ‘amortising bonds’. These are bonds which will pay out equal annual payments which are made up of a coupon payment and part of the principal which would usually be repaid at the expiry of the bond. They are ideally suited to sovereign annuities.
The trustees of pension schemes may from time to time find that they have to exercise a discretion where they have a direct personal interest in the outcome of the exercise of the discretion e.g. because they are members who benefit from the exercise of the discretion – possibly at the expense of other classes of members. Can a trustee in such a situation take any part in the decision over how to exercise the discretion and still comply with his fiduciary duties to members? …